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The Ukrainian case of fiscal devaluation in small open economies 
 
This article examines the effects of fiscal devaluation on the trade balance of a country with a small open 
economy. It is assumed that typically such countries are price-takers which means low price elasticity of 
exports and imports. If this assumption is true, then it’s impossible to make impact on trade balance 
through the price mechanism and, accordingly, fiscal devaluation will not have significant effects. To 
confirm or reject this hypothesis it is necessary to determine causal relationships between changes in 
fiscal devaluation indicator and trade balance dynamics. Applying a series of causality tests to Ukrainian 
data the authors argue that dynamics of trade balance causes changes in VAT and social security 
contributions. Opposite causality wasn’t detected. This fact is treated as evidence of fiscal devaluation 
inefficiency in Ukrainian-like economies on the one hand and as price-taking characteristics of Ukraine 
on the other hand. The potential null effect of fiscal devaluation was confirmed with SVAR modeling. 
JEL classifications: E62, F32, F41. 
Keywords: Fiscal devaluation, Hsiao causality test, Price-takers, Small open economy, Trade 
balance.    
 
Introduction 
Recently statements have begun to appear in business and academic publications about fiscal 
devaluation as an instrument for improving a country’s trade balance. Having originated into 
the economically developed world, this concept actively ʻmigratesʼ in developing countries 
today. Not so long ago, it started to be discussed in Ukraine where it is now regarded as a 
promising innovative instrument for fostering export. But it seems that under Ukrainian 
conditions, the implementation of fiscal devaluation raises more questions than answers. 
That’s why it’s worth taking a closer look at fiscal devaluation in conditions of economies 
such as the Ukrainian economy.  
The world economic downturn and restrictions of monetary policy as an instrument of 
economic regulation have led to a new round of debate on fiscal instruments of support 
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exporters in the eurozone countries. Since these countries have limited space for monetary 
stimulation (a traditional instrument – the exchange rate devaluation – can’t be used by a 
member of the monetary union), this is the place where the idea to simulate the effect of 
currency depreciation by tax policy measures was created. This idea was called ʻfiscal 
devaluationʼ. The ability to mimic the effects of currency devaluation by means of fiscal 
policy instruments makes this topic extremely important among scientists and policymakers 
today, when monetary instruments are limited because of monetary union membership or 
fixed exchange policies which are rather widespread.  
However, the issue of fiscal devaluation efficiency in conditions of different 
economies remains sparsely studied. Using the case of Ukraine, the authors analyze casual 
links between fiscal devaluation measures, which are defined as the gap between employers’ 
social security contributions (SOC) and VAT, and the state of trade balance. Thus, the 
hypothesis investigated is that in small open economies such as Ukraine’s fiscal devaluation 
can have zero effect. The practical contribution consists of an answer to the question – is it 
possible with the help of fiscal policy (in the form of increased VAT rates and decreased 
SOC) to make an impact on the level of domestic prices and, therefore, on the trade balance of 
a country with a small open economy. In case of positive answer it can be concluded that the 
instrument of fiscal devaluation is applicable to economies like Ukraine’s. If the alternative 
hypothesis confirmed (exports prices are set exogenously and domestic fiscal policy doesn’t 
affect them), then fiscal devaluation should be excluded from the list of feasible fiscal 
instruments. The article is structured as follows. The first section analyzes fiscal devaluation 
theory and previous empirical results of studies of its effects on an economy. The next section 
is an explanation of the main hypothesis of the study and the methods used for testing. The 
third section presents empirical results obtained from testing the hypothesis. The last section 
gives a summary of findings and some implications for policy.  
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Theoretical issues and previous literature  
Discussion of fiscal devaluation theory has a relatively long history. At first the idea 
regarding the ability to mimic the effect of currency devaluation by means of fiscal 
instruments was proposed by J. M. Keynes (1931). However, a new round of discussions 
about the feasibility of fiscal devaluation and its potential effects started along with the 
establishment of functioning monetary unions and a significant liberalization of world trade. 
Accordingly, to achieve the study objectives  it is necessary to analyze the existing literature 
regarding fiscal devaluation.  
Historically, the first theory was the so-called ʻKeynesianʼ fiscal devaluation version. 
Taking into account the functioning of a monetary system under gold standard conditions 
which made currency devaluation unfeasible, J. M. Keynes (1931) proposed an alternative. 
He suggested the application of ad valorem customs tariff to all imports together with the 
same size export subsidies to all national exports. This combination results in an imports cost 
rise for domestic consumers and creates cost advantages for exporters. However, the measures 
proposed by Keynes (1931) have a pronounced protectionist nature. The application of such 
mechanisms in the context of international trade liberalization will likely create political 
pressure from trading partners as a consequence. On the other hand, Krugman and Obstfeld 
(1997) argue that in ʻsmallʼ country conditions, i. e. a country that cannot have a significant 
impact on world market prices, such a policy will lead to significant economic losses. 
According to their research, for a country that has an impact on world prices (has a significant 
share in world trade), the effect of a customs the duty is a wedge-shaped spreading of 
domestic and foreign market prices. As a result, there is an increase of domestic prices of the 
country, which introduces the duty (but not on duty full-size) and decrease of world prices. 
When a ʻsmallʼ country imposes customs duties, its share in goods procurements on the world 
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market is very small at the outset, therefore reducing its imports has little effect on the world 
price. Actually the world price of imported goods can be considered as an exogenously given 
variable. This negates the expected effect of terms of trade improving. Use of export subsidies 
also worsens trade conditions, and that’s why such a combination of foreign trade policy 
instruments can have a very dubious effect on the state of trade balance and economic growth 
in general.  
Thus, the case of a country with a small open economy, which has no significant 
impact on world prices, the so-called price-taking country, is a subject for separate 
examination concerning the expected effects of fiscal devaluation for such countries.  
To contemporary version of fiscal devaluation treats the structure of tax system as a 
source of export stimulation. In academic circles, actively discussed the mechanism of fiscal 
devaluation, consisting of two main blocks: the VAT increase as the main consumption tax 
and the reduction of SOC paid by employers. The basic idea of fiscal devaluation is pretty 
simple and can be summarized as follows. Employers’ SOC are a burdensome tax, having a 
destructive impact on employment as proven in a number of economic researches (Daveri and 
Tabellini 1997, Nickel 2004, OECD 2011) and through it – on economic growth. Reduction 
of such contributions in the future could stimulate a decline in the illegal sector of the labor 
market and, most importantly, reduce the cost of production in the national economy, 
including export sectors. This means that exporters will be able to sell their products 
somewhat cheaper abroad; meanwhile goods on the domestic market should also fall in price.  
At the same time, the value added tax as the main consumption tax is increased with a 
triple purpose. First, the transition from taxation on an ʻoriginʼ basis to a taxation on a 
ʻdestinationʼ basis, which corresponds to the principle of equity in taxation. Second, the VAT 
imposed on imports automatically makes them more expensive, while exporters receive a 
VAT refund. Third, VAT acts as a compensator for budget revenues that will be lost due to 
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the reduction of SOC of employers. The initial conditions needed are: a monetary policy 
inefficient for export stimulation, manifested in a tightening of the nominal exchange rate; 
rigidity of nominal wages in the economy, manifested in slow and disproportionate reaction 
of nominal wages on the change in prices of consumption. It is important to note that this 
assumption suggests that fiscal devaluation has short-term effects. 
The literature, analyzed in this study, can be divided into two parts: one part is devoted 
to the analysis of fiscal devaluation impact on the economy of different country groups, and 
the second attempts to answer the question of whether a government can influence trade 
balance dynamics through prices (in particular through currency devaluation) or if prices are 
set exogenously.    
One of the most cited articles referring to the impact of indirect taxation on foreign 
trade is the seminal study of Krugman and Feldstein (1989). This study refuted the opinion 
that VAT as tax, which, due to the fact that it is charged on imports, while exports have zero 
VAT rate, can be considered as an instrument for promoting export competitiveness on world 
markets. Zero VAT rate is considered as a necessary element of the VAT administration 
process, without which the latter would become a tax on exports – a protectionist measure that 
will eventually lead to a reduction in both exports and imports. From the standpoint of fiscal 
devaluation it is incumbent to focus on the claim that the VAT can be considered as a 
substitute for direct taxes, because it is not neutral in terms of foreign trade. Such tax reform 
can lead to redistributive effects that can stimulate short-term improvement in trade balance. 
Due to the fact that such a shift increases the tax burden on tradable goods, compared to 
nontradables, resources in the long-run remove from tradables sector, thus reducing the 
competitiveness of economy in general. Applying simple model, which includes three 
different products and two periods, justified the conclusion that shift in taxation from income 
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tax to VAT in the short-term has an ambiguous effect on a country’s net export, but in the 
long-run such reform with great probability leads to a reduction of net export.  
Lipinska and Von Thadden (2009) indirectly investigate the problem of fiscal 
devaluation. They apply DSGE-model of two monetary union countries to study unilateral 
shifts in the tax system from direct towards indirect taxes. Because of model specification, 
which includes price rigidity, but competitive labor market with flexible wages, they find that 
the effects of shifting from direct taxes to indirect ones are not significant. 
One of the first comprehensive works, where the mechanism of fiscal devaluation was 
described in detail, is the research of de Mooij and Keen (2012). This paper is a brief analysis 
of preconditions for fiscal devaluation in eurozone countries, namely: increasing budget 
deficits and public debt; the current policy of fiscal consolidation; the necessity to improve 
exporters’ competitiveness on international markets. As the traditional mechanism of export 
fostering – currency devaluation – in the euro area is not applicable, fiscal devaluation is 
considered as an alternative way for the European governments. At the same time the key 
importance for effectiveness of fiscal devaluation is given to nominal rigidities in prices and 
exchange rate. Using a regression analysis of panel data for 30 OECD countries over the 
period from 1965 to 2009 the authors concluded  that in short-run tax shift from  SOC to VAT 
at the rate of one percent of GDP increases net exports of the euro area countries by 3,44% of 
GDP. For OECD countries that are not members of the euro area this effect is less obvious. 
Following this conclusion, it is logical to assume that the effects of fiscal devaluation in 
countries with small open economies will differ significantly from those described in the 
study for the OECD countries. De Mooij and Keen (2012) also argue that the effectiveness of 
fiscal devaluation strongly depends on the nature of the VAT increase, which is used to 
ensure budget neutrality of reform. In the article arise such issues as whether policy makers 
should increase basic of reduced VAT rate, how the tax base coverage should be changed. 
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Separately, some possible difficulties for fiscal devaluation implementation are analyzed: the 
increased VAT component of the fiscal devaluation reduces the value of non-labor income to 
consumers, whether from transfers or capital income, which will not be compensated by a 
decrease of SOC for these types of income; the presence of tradables and nontradables in an 
economy that will cause a shift towards the production of the latter, as they are potentially 
more labor intensive (such a shift will not stimulate trade balance improvement). Special 
attention is paid to the problem of coordination during realization of fiscal devaluation 
measures. The point is that implementation of fiscal devaluation at the same time in several 
countries that are trading partners significantly reduces the efficiency of fiscal devaluation for 
each individual country. It’s worth mentioning that this study covers only developed countries 
that have modern sophisticated system of institutions and interact effectively with external 
partners, while the analysis of fiscal devaluation potential for developing countries without 
powerful positions in the world was not studied. 
Commenting on the article of de Mooij and Keen (2012), Poterba (2013) conducts 
theoretical formalization of budget neutral fiscal devaluation through the interaction of supply 
and demand on the labor market. Thus, the supply of labor depends on the real wage after 
taxes, ,)1/()r1( PIT prw VAT  where w  – nominal wage, p  – nominal output price, PITr  – the 
rate of personal income tax, which is included for completeness, VATr  – the VAT rate. Labor 
demand depends on the real wage facing the firm, prw SCR /)1(  , where SCRr  – rate of 
employers’ social contributions. Budget neutral fiscal devaluation consists in decrease of SCRr  
and increase of VATr . Therefore, the potential effect of a fiscal devaluation on the labor market 
is a short-term employment increase. The author also considers the possibility of targeted 
fiscal devaluation, i. e. reduction of employers’ SOC for those sectors of economy, which 
need to improve foreign markets competitiveness the most. Although such a policy is likely to 
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lead to additional distortions, it will enable a lower increase in VAT to ensure budget 
neutrality.  
A study of fiscal devaluation conducted by IMF experts (Fiscal monitor 2011) is 
interesting respecting theoretical analysis of fiscal devaluation impact on labor markets in 
countries that implements such policies. One  of  the  departure  points  for  fiscal  devaluation  
is  an equilibrium  on  labor  market  when  SOC affect the demand side of the market and 
consumption taxes (VAT) make impact on supply side of the market. In this paper the authors 
presented a simplified graphical model of labor market equilibrium which illustrates the 
nature of short-term increase in employment in the case of fiscal devaluation implementation. 
However, mainly issues of the interior design of the tax reform were addressed in the 
research. For instance, the authors concluded that a reduction of employers’ SOC should be 
focused on lower level wages and realized through the lowering of upper wage bounds for 
such contributions charge, while increasing the basic or additional VAT rates (especially if 
they are high enough already) stimulates tax evasion.  Meanwhile very important questions 
concerning possible drawbacks of fiscal devaluation realization in world-wide market scale 
are unclear. 
The research of Farhi et al. (2011) assumed an operation of national economy in terms 
of the dynamic New Keynesian open economy environment, one of the assumptions of which 
is the presence of short-term nominal price rigidities in economy. The authors conducted a 
theoretical analysis of different fiscal devaluation options feasibility. On that basis it was 
concluded that there exists a combination of fiscal tools, which is able to replicate the effects 
of currency devaluation if the latter is held constant. The choice of such instruments 
according to the article depends on the structure of market assets in the national economy, the 
currency of public debt denomination, as well as the nature of the devaluation (expected or 
unexpected). Besides that, the researchers conclude that scenarios of fiscal devaluation 
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realization must be accompanied by the gradual reduction of consumption taxes and 
increasing of income taxes. It should be noted that the article conducted a comprehensive 
analysis of fiscal devaluation specifics as from the standpoint of economic agents, and from 
the standpoint of the national and international economy. At the same time, there is a 
considerable room for studying the problems of fiscal devaluation implementation in practice, 
taking into account the realities of functioning economic systems of individual countries.  
The study of Franco (2011) analyzed the main reasons for fiscal devaluation in 
Portugal. Together with a justification of fiscal devaluation’s theoretical aspects the author 
describes classic New Keynesian model of open economy, which contains two countries 
(country and abroad) as well as two sectors of goods (tradables and nontradables). The paper 
evaluated a number of VAR equations with Portuguese data and then modeled the impact of 
decreased SOC and compensatory increase of VAT on exports and imports. The results 
indicate a possibility of a short-term trade balance increase by means of fiscal devaluation.   
Of a special interest in Franco (2011) is the extension of fiscal devaluation model to 
the case of a country that is price-taker on foreign markets and can’t affect either the volume 
or the price of its own exports. In such a situation, the positive effects of fiscal devaluation are 
minimized; moreover, fiscal devaluation may even be harmful for the economy. In this 
regard, the research of countries’ ability to make impact on the quantity and quality of its own 
exports on the world market is an important task for a comprehensive analysis of fiscal 
devaluation.   
European Commission Taxation Papers Working Paper N.36 (2013) is the most 
comprehensive research of fiscal devaluation, which includes theoretical and empirical 
components. The theoretical part includes a detailed description of basic preconditions and 
assumptions of fiscal devaluation, such as price and nominal exchange rate rigidities and 
description of the major difficulties that may arise during the fiscal devaluation. 
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The empirical part of the study consists of macro- and microsimulation analysis of 
fiscal devaluation effects on the economies of France, Italy, Spain and Austria. It’s should be 
pointed out also the analysis of effects in conditions of joint fiscal devaluation 
implementation in trading partners. At the same time, the situation when country is unable to 
affect the price and quantity of exports is only casually mentioned in the study, leaving a 
significant gap for research unfilled. 
Koske (2013) analyzed the potential advantages and disadvantages of a fiscal 
devaluation policy and discussed conditions under which such a policy could produce 
extended effects. The main thesis of this study is that the fiscal devaluation creates mostly 
temporary effects, while any permanent real effects are negligible. Thus, fiscal devaluation 
can’t be used as a substitute for deep structural reforms on financial and commodity markets, 
as well as the labor market. It should be noted that the author analyzes conditions necessary 
for the effectiveness of fiscal devaluation, and focuses on the price elasticity of exports. 
Improving trade balance, which is the main objective of fiscal devaluation, is more palpable, 
as exports and imports of the country are more sensitive to fluctuations in respective prices. 
Accordingly, if for any reason such sensitivity is absent or greatly limited the effectiveness of 
fiscal devaluation is questionable. At the same time, these price effects are stronger and more 
resilient in the face of nominal exchange rate rigidity, which is a necessary condition for the 
effectiveness of fiscal devaluation.  
Thus, the fiscal devaluation operates through the price mechanism, and all the possible 
benefits for the national economy are determined by this mechanism’s functioning. However, 
for developing countries critical realities are hidden behind a coherent theoretical framework 
of the fiscal devaluation which, ultimately, may negate any positive effects. First of all, it’s 
necessary to pay attention to two fundamental assumptions of this theory: 1) monetary policy 
can’t be implemented due to lack of capacity to regulate exchange rate, which may occur 
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inside a monetary union or within fixed exchange rate regime; 2) exporters react to fiscal 
devaluation by decreasing prices, and these, reduced export prices determine the demand for 
export products in the world. 
The idea of fiscal devaluation was created in countries that are monetary union 
members and are not free to use the nominal exchange rate for short-term economic 
stimulation. The reasons for monetary policy inactivity here are in the institutional field. But 
the possibilities and consequences of fiscal devaluation may significantly differ for the 
countries where monetary policy is limited for other reasons. For instance, in Ukraine 
monetary policy also can’t have a significant impact on the economy, because of de facto 
fixed nominal exchange rate. There are two main reasons for conducting fixed exchange rate 
policy in Ukraine: critical imports and the rising external debt of the government. In other 
words, the reason for exchange rate rigidity lies in the economic plane. If fiscal devaluation is 
implemented in countries with a Ukrainian economic model, export prices may decline1, and 
import prices are guaranteed to rise, including critical import prices, which can’t be 
abandoned or replaced by domestic production. Thus, import and export characteristics that 
restrict currency devaluation also restrict fiscal devaluation. If fiscal devaluation should copy 
its monetary analogue, it also extends on the negative effects. Thus, in countries, where the 
limitations of monetary policy in stimulating exports and domestic output are caused by 
structural economic problems, the possibility for fiscal devaluation will be limited also. First 
of all, these are countries that are forced to accept external prices for goods and services 
(price-takers) and which have a large proportion of critical import. Ukraine is exactly such 
country, however this is typical for many countries with small open economies.  
Now on the price mechanism functioning. The idea that exporters are able to affect 
demand for their products, manipulating prices is rather controversial. The discussion here 
goes beyond the fiscal devaluation and turns to the question: ʻWhat factors determine a 
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country’s volume of exports ?ʼ The polemics on this issue have been actively conducted since 
the 1970s and were intended to determine whether a country with a small open economy is 
capable by changing prices to adjust the volume of exports, or if export is determined by the 
income of importing countries. The latter hypothesis has received far more empirical 
evidences than the former. In other words, the export prices of countries like Ukraine are 
determined by external demand, rather than the supply of goods inside the country.  
The problem is that in international trade Ukraine acts as a ʻdouble price-takerʼ. On 
the one hand, it’s hard to change the volume of exports setting prices as exports and the 
corresponding prices are not determined by supply side. Contrarily, prices are determined by 
outside world (demand side). On the other hand regarding a number of trade positions which 
are very weighty, it’s hard to influence the price of imports, because it is critical for Ukraine. 
These features of the Ukrainian economy will lead to a situation where the effect of fiscal 
devaluation will be much weaker than expected. 
Considering the indicated points, an important objective is to study the possible effects 
of fiscal devaluation in price-taking countries. Namely the problem is the following: do 
countries like Ukraine tend to improve their trade balances in response to the increase of VAT 
burden and decrease of employers’ social contributions?  
The debates concerning the relationship between prices and trade balance of a country 
are conducted in the plane of determining price and external demand elasticities of the exports 
in small open economies. The seminal work on this issue was an article by Riedel (1988) in 
which the author in contrast to existing ideas claimed that for low developed economies 
(LDC) price elasticity of exports is much higher than the external demand elasticity. That is a 
change in prices for domestic products (through currency devaluation, for example) can have 
an impact on the volume of exports. According to the author, the erroneous results in previous 
studies were caused by ignoring the supply side in elasticities calculations. At the same time 
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Riedel (1998) conducts an empirical analysis of just one of the LDCs (Hong Kong), while 
analysis of data for a number of low developed countries leads to the opposite conclusion. 
The article Faini et al. (1992) empirically proved the importance of demand factors in 
determining export volumes, although attention is drawn to the importance of supply-side 
factors (price) in such analysis. In the paper Muscatelli et al. (1995) researchers, applying 
somewhat different empirical technique to a group of Asian Newly Industrialised Economies 
(NIEs) came to the same conclusion as most previous studies – the factor of external demand 
has a much stronger effect on exports volume than the supply factor (price changes). This 
refutes the small country assumption, made earlier in Riedel (1988). To summarize, besides 
studies mentioned here there was much research conducted to identify the influential factors 
determining country's trade balance with the application of different techniques and 
specifications regarding price and external demand elasticities. The results are pretty mixed. 
However, the determination of these parameters is a very important task for understanding of 
possible fiscal devaluation effects in countries like Ukraine. 
Theoretical model, empirical methodology and data  
Theoretical model of fiscal devaluation impact on the economy is appropriate to analyze 
through the real exchange rate, which is calculated by the formula:  
ER୰=ER୬×
୔౛౮౪
୔౟౤౪
,      (1) 
where ER୰=ER୬×
୔౛౮౪
୔౟౤౪
  – the nominal exchange rate (national currency / foreign currency);  
௘ܲ௫௧	– price index of country’s major trading partners; 
௜ܲ௡௧ – price index of a country. 
The nominal exchange rate devaluation (ܧܴ௡) leads to the rising of real exchange rate, 
which cause export prices decrease and makes imports more expensive. Theoretically that 
results in improved competitiveness of national products on the world market. Under the 
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conditions of currency devaluation impossibility the ratio of world and domestic prices can be 
the source of improving competitiveness in the world market. 
A policy of fiscal devaluation aims to stimulate national exports due to the differences 
in world and domestic prices, which are created through the tax system. Fiscal devaluation 
has a complicated impact on the real exchange rate but it should be examined in the context of 
exports and imports separately. 
Rising VAT rates directly affects the increase of import prices and duplicates the 
effect of currency devaluation on importers as it leads to an increase in the real exchange rate: 
ER୰౟ౣ౦=ER୬×
୔౛౮౪ା∆୚୅୘
୔౟౤౪
     (2) 
where ∆ܸܣܶ – the magnitude of import prices increasing caused by rising VAT rates.   
At the same time inside economy SOC are decreased resulting, as is assumed in 
theory, in lower prices in both domestic and export sectors. It becomes possible due to refund 
of VAT to exporters, i. e. they are not affected by VAT increase. Thus, there is dubbing of 
currency devaluation effect on exporters. Appreciation of the real exchange rate becomes 
significant for exporters:   
ER୰೐ೣ೛ = ܧܴ௡ ×
୔౛౮౪
୔౟౤౪ି∆ୗ୓େ
     (3) 
However, this theoretical scheme may not work if the country is a price-taker. Fiscal 
devaluation aims to adjust the balance of external and internal prices, but in these countries 
the price elasticity of imports and exports is low. In this case, the rise in import prices will 
have little effect on the volume of imports as import is critical (for instance energy goods for 
a country with poor natural resources). Meanwhile export prices will not drop significantly as 
they are exogenously given by the economic situation in external economic partners. 
Thus, for price-takers the effect of fiscal devaluation will be minimal. Price-takers are 
countries that have a small share in world international trade, and for which the price 
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elasticity is much lower than external demand elasticity of exports for certain products. The 
same is applicable to imports, when consumption structure of the country contains a large 
share of imported goods which, in the case of price increase, is difficult to refuse or to 
establish domestic output without serious economic losses. In the case of Ukraine energy 
products play the role of critical imports, prices on which are determined outside of Ukraine. 
The majority of exports consist of raw materials or products with low added value (see Figure 
1), prices of which also can’t be influenced by Ukraine because of high competition on these 
markets and the low proportion of Ukrainian goods on these markets. To determine whether a 
country is price-taker and, accordingly, whether there is a possibility to obtain a positive 
effect from fiscal devaluation it is necessary to evaluate the function of supply and demand 
for exports and imports. After this, it is necessary to analyze the relevant price and demand 
factors elasticities. However, the estimation of such models is a complicated process because 
of the endogeneity problem. This study suggests approaching the problem from another angle. 
The idea of the study is to analyze causality between changes in the structure of the fiscal 
burden, which we define as the difference between VAT and SOC, and the level of net 
exports. Two alternative hypotheses will be tested: ܪ଴: (ݒܽݐ − ݏ݋ܿ) 	→ 	ܶܤ	and	ܪଵ: ܶܤ	 →
(ݒܽݐ − ݏ݋ܿ)	where TB – the trade balance; vat – indicator of VAT; soc – indicator of 
employers’ SOC. Hypothesis testing is conducted using Ukrainian data. In case of 
ܪ଴	confirmation it can be argued that fiscal devaluation will have a positive effect in Ukraine 
and the country is not a price-taker as exports and imports have significant domestic prices 
elasticity. If the alternative ܪଵ hypothesis will be confirmed, primarily due to revenues from 
VAT, then fiscal devaluation will not have a significant effect and Ukraine is a price-taking 
country.  
[Figure 1 here] 
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To identify casual relationships and to analyze the possible impact of fiscal 
devaluation on the trade balance of the country the following approach is proposed: 1) to test 
the generated data sets for stationarity; 2) to transform all the data in a stationary form and 
apply the Granger-causality test 3) to test data on the presence of cointegration; 4) in case of 
cointegration detection apply Hsiao test using long-term cointegration relationship; 5) having 
information about casual relationships between time series construct impulse response 
functions to a shock in the ratio of VAT and SOC.  
The essence of the Granger causality test is to estimate a model of the form (4) for two 
stationary variables using OLS:  
ݕ௧ = ߙ଴ +∑ ߙଵଵ
௞ ݕ௧ି௞ +	∑ ߙଵଶ
௞ ݔ௧ି௞ +	߭ଵ,௧ 	
௞మ
௞ୀ௞బ
	௞భ௞ୀଵ ,   (4)  
where ݇଴ = 1 and apply F-test for testing the null hypothesis ܪ଴:	ߙଵଶ
ଵ = ߙଵଶ
ଶ = ⋯ = ߙଵଶ
௞మ = 0. 
Confirmation of null hypothesis means, that the hypothesis that x is not the reason y can’t be 
rejected. Changing variables in places we can test the hypothesis that y is not a reason x. If in 
both cases the null hypothesis is rejected, the two processes show a feedback relation.  
The drawback of the Granger causality test is that its results strongly depend on the 
order of lags included in the regression. Therefore, including the incorrect number of lags in 
regression a researcher receives inconsistent results and can lead to erroneous conclusions. To 
mitigate this problem, Hsiao (1981) proposed a lag selection procedure, which is based on the 
final prediction error criteria.  This approach implies assessment of two types of regressions:  
ݕ௧ = ߙ଴ +∑ ߙଵଵ
௞భݕ௧ି௞భ +	߭ଵ,௧ 	
௞భ
௞ୀଵ     (5) 
ݕ௧ = ߙ଴ + ∑ ߙଵଵ
௞భݕ௧ି௞భ +	∑ ߙଵଶ
௞మݔ௧ି௞మ +	߭ଶ,௧ 	
௞మ
௞ୀଵ 	
௞భ
௞ୀଵ    (6) 
and selection the optimal number of lags for each variable basing on the final prediction error 
(FPE). Causality identification procedure is as follows:  
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1) for one of the variables, say y, are run a series of regressions of the fit (5) with prespecified 
interval of lags ݇ଵ ∈ [1;݉]. For each regression estimated FPE, regression, which produces 
the smallest value of FPE, contains the optimal lag (m*). Thus, FPEy (m*, 0) – the minimum 
value at that stage of a series of FPE, calculated as follows:  
ܨܲܧ௠ =
(்ା௠ାଵ)
(்ି௠ିଵ)
×
ௌௌா(௠)
்
     (7) 
where T – the number of observations, SSE – sum of squared errors.  
2) on the next stage estimated a series of regressions of the fit (6) subject to restrictions 
݇ଵ = ݉ ∗, ݇ଶ ∈ [1; ݊]. In other words, the number of lags for y fixed at m*, the number of 
lags for x is chosen through a selection of regression with the smallest FPE, which for 
regression (6) can be designated as FPEy (m*, n*). For regressions of the fit (6) FPE is 
calculated:  
ܨܲܧ௠∗,௡ =
(்ା௠∗ା௡ାଵ)
(்ି௠∗ି௡ିଵ)
×
ௌௌா(௠∗,௡)
்
    (8) 
3) to determine the causality must be compared meanings of FPE y (m*, 0) and FPE y (m*, 
n*). If FPEy (m*, 0) > FPEy (m*, n*) it can be concluded that x Granger causes y, if FPEy 
(m*, 0) < FPEy (m*, n*) it can be concluded that x doesn’t Granger cause y.  
Analysis of causality using the Granger and Hsiao approaches takes into account only 
short-term relationships between variables, as they are transformed into a stationary form. For 
the separation of short-term, long-term causal relationships it is possible to use error 
correction model (ECM) modification of the Hsiao test. Cointegration tests and detected 
presence of common stochastic trend in time series suggest that one of the variables causes 
another one in the long-term. For instance, if in accordance with test results the number of 
cointegrating equations in the system is less than the number of variables, then those variables 
that do not contain long-term relationships in their dynamic models contain stochastic trends 
that drive other variables (Kirchgässner and Wolters 2007). Inserting long-term equilibrium 
19 
 
equation in regressions (5) and (6) and using standard Hsiao procedure, a researcher can 
identify short-term causality.  
Determination of causality provides additional information to identify the matrix of 
structural shocks for SVAR-model. After imposing appropriate restrictions the function of 
responses to shocks in tax structure and trade balance can be derived. Thus it can be 
concluded whether a fiscal devaluation in Ukraine may have a positive impact on the trade 
balance.  
To test proposed hypotheses based on Ukrainian macrostatistics quarterly time series 
were formed for the period from first quarter 2001 to second quarter 2013 for trade balance 
(TB) and the gap between employers' SOC and VAT. The difference between SOC and VAT 
should indicate the proximity of economy to actual fiscal devaluation, since reduction of this 
variable means the growth of VAT payments and declining of SOC. Later in the article this 
variable will be denoted as FD. Time series for indicators of interest were built in two variants 
– the absolute values (TB, FD) and GDP ratios (tb, fd). While analyzing absolute values of 
trade balance time series were converted to national currency equivalent at the current 
exchange rate on the cash market, then FD and TB time series have been transformed into 
prices of 2007 to get the real measures. All variables were seasonally adjusted with Census 
X12 filter, except variable fd as seasonality wasn’t detected.  
 
 
Estimation results  
The first step in causality testing is the identification of time series integration order and the 
presence of a deterministic trend, as the Granger causality test requires stationary data. For 
that purpose each time series was tested for stationarity applying the DF-GLS test2, with 
respective results summarized in Table 1.  For each variable testing procedure stopped, when 
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it was possible to identify which category of processes variable presents – the trend-stationary 
(TS) or difference-stationary (DS) process. Test results indicate that the time series of trade 
balance in absolute and relative terms (TB, tb) are first order integrated (I (1)). Variable fd is 
I(0) and is stationary without any transformations, FD, considering test results is TS-process.  
[Table 1 here] 
To transform variables into the stationary form were taken first difference of TB and tb 
time series. Stationary form of variable FD was obtained by extraction of linear trend. 
Respectively were formed time series for variables d_TB, d_tb, TR_FD. Figure 2 displays 
dynamics of transformed variables and FD variable, which is stationary itself. Visual analysis 
of time series allows to identify a few outliers that should be taken into account in the analysis 
of causality. For variables that represent the dynamics of trade balance such points are the 
second quarter of 2005, the first quarter of 2009 and the second quarter of 2012. For variables 
that indicate the gap between VAT and SOC tax burden, such points are the third quarter of 
2006, fourth quarter of 2009, third quarter of 2010 and third quarter of 2011. To avoid 
problems with the distribution of errors in constructed regressions and to obtain reliable 
coefficients in the analysis appropriate dummy variables should be introduced. Dummies can 
be conditionally divided into three types: mean-shift dummies – represent shocks which 
induce the change of average rate of process development or dramatically change the local 
mean; permanent intervention dummies – indicate the shocks that have a long-term impact on 
the process and change the trend of development; transitory shock dummies – represent short-
term shocks that quickly leveled and do not affect the long-term trend of development 
(Juselius 2006, p. 102). Visual inspection of the data suggests that the shocks were either 
transitive or permanent. Thus, as a transitive shocks, applying dummy variables were 
introduced in analysis the third quarter of 2010 for fd and TR_FD (with the leveling influence 
in the first quarter of 2011) and the second quarter of 2012 for trade balance variables (with 
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the leveling influence in the third quarter of 2012). Other outliers were treated with permanent 
intervention dummies.  
[Figure 2 here] 
After data transformation and the introduction of dummy variables a series of Granger 
causality tests were conducted (see Table 2). For estimation of regression parameters an HAC 
estimator was used to mitigate the consequences of possible autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity, derive robust standard errors and therefore appropriate significance 
statistics for coefficients.  
[Table 2 here] 
Results of Granger causality tests basically argue that the null hypothesis of no causal 
relationship between trade balance dynamics and changes in SOC-VAT gap can be rejected. 
At the same time causality in the reverse direction can’t be confirmed for at least 6 quarters 
horizon.  
Testing causality of stationary time series, researcher analyzes the short-term 
relationships between variables. To separate short- and long-term effects it is  necessary to 
run a VECM regression and based on the long-term equations conduct the Hsiao test. Before 
VECM construction it’s necessary to test for cointegration, while time series should be non-
stationary and have the same order of integration. Relative variables tb and fd do not meet 
these requirements because fd is I (0) variable. Test for cointegration can be applied to time 
series in absolute terms – TB and FD, as they become stationary after extracting stochastic 
and deterministic trend respectively. While testing for cointegration needs to be determined 
deterministic part of long-term relationship, as this could affect the outcome of testing. In this 
data case the decision must be made whether to include linear trend and dummy variables in 
the long-term equation. If the same deterministic components influenced both studied 
processes, then their effect will be canceled in a cointegration relationship and there is no 
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need to include them. Alternatively, if the trend or structural shifts determine the long term 
behavior of only one of the processes, it should be taken into account in the cointegration 
relationship (Juselius 2006, p. 109). Based on this logic, the linear trend was included in 
cointegration equation (CE), as it is characteristic only for FD variable. Dummies were not 
included in a long-term relationship. Some of them are transitive, thus affect only short-term 
dynamics by definition. In relation to permanent intervention dummies it is assumed that they 
have had an impact on the long-term dynamics of both time series and therefore they aren’t 
introduced in CE. At the same time they are included as exogenous variables in that part of 
the equation that describes short-term dynamics. The results of testing for the presence and 
order of cointegration are presented in Table 33.  
[Table 3 here] 
The presence of one stochastic trend indicates that one of the variables is weakly 
exogenous and contains a stochastic trend that drives whole system (Kirchgässner and 
Wolters, p. 204). In other words, this is a variable that is the cause of long-term changes in 
other variables. Considering the adjustment coefficient in the VECM regression (see Table 4) 
such variable is just the trade balance.  
[Table 4 here] 
VECM indicates that long-term causality runs from the trade balance to a gap between 
VAT and SOC, and not vice versa. To isolate the short-term causality Hsiao test was 
performed taking into account long-term equilibrium relation, which is Cointegrating 
Equation from Table 4. Instead of regression (5), (6), regressions of type (7), (8) where ݖ௧ିଵ – 
the long-term equilibrium relation were constructed. All other aspects of the testing procedure 
are the same as was described in methodology (see Table 5).  
∆ݕ௧ = ߙ଴ +∑ ߙଵଵ
௞భ∆ݕ௧ି௞భ + ߜݖ௧ିଵ	+߭ଵ,௧	
௞భ
௞ୀଵ     (9) 
∆ݕ௧ = ߙ଴ +∑ ߙଵଵ
௞భ∆ݕ௧ି௞భ +	∑ ߙଵଶ
௞మ∆ݔ௧ି௞మ + ߜݖ௧ିଵ +	߭ଶ,௧	
௞మ
௞ୀଵ 	
௞భ
௞ୀଵ   (10) 
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[Table 5 here] 
Analysis of the short-term dynamics by applying the Hsiao test application also 
indicates that Ukraine's trade balance fluctuations cause fluctuations in the difference between 
VAT and SOC. Introduction of TR_FD variable doesn’t improve FPE criterion for model of 
trade balance dynamics with lag order selected by Hsiao procedure 
(ܨܲܧ்஻(m=1)<	ܨܲܧ்஻(m*=1,n=1)). In turn, the inclusion of trade balance dynamics with one 
lag in regression of fiscal devaluation indicator improves the model 
(ܨܲܧி஽(m=1)>	ܨܲܧி஽(m*=1,n=1)). The same conclusion can be made from analysis of 
differenced variables coefficients in the VECM regression (see Table 4).  
Time series analysis argues that the trade balance dynamics of Ukraine is an 
exogenous factor regarding fluctuations of VAT and employers' SOC. This information can 
be used to identify the structural shocks matrix of two processes. Accordingly two SVAR 
models for absolute and relative measures of trade balance and SOC-VAT gap were built. The 
order of lags was chosen using information criteria, and regressions also were tested for the 
presence of residuals autocorrelation. In these models restrictions on the matrix of structural 
shocks were imposed in such a way that the initial shock occurs in trade balance. Meanwhile 
there is no instantaneous response to changes in the indicator of fiscal devaluation, i.e. 
restrictions imposed according to previous results regarding causality. The results of 
responses to trade balance shocks for both types of models are displayed on Figure 3. It’s 
worth noting that, changing the order of the impulses in the system of equations does not 
significantly affect the overall result – trade balance shocks have a significant impact on the 
level of VAT and SOC, while the reverse effect isn’t observed.  
[Figure 3 here] 
Positive response of fiscal devaluation indicator to a one standard deviation shock in 
trade balance means, first of all, VAT revenues decrease because of import drop and 
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increased VAT refund obligations in respect with export growth. External trading positive 
shock also has positive impact on social security contributions as the economy is export-
oriented though SOC response isn’t as fast as for VAT revenues. 
Conclusion  
This study makes another contribution to the debate about the possible effects of fiscal 
devaluation on an economy. In particular, the case of Ukraine shows that for a small open 
economy causality may go not from the tax system to country's trade balance, but in the 
opposite direction. The reason for that is a low price elasticity of consumption, whether this is 
consumption of imported goods inside the country or consumption of exports by trade 
partners. Such countries are called price-takers. The result of such causality pattern is that 
equivalent fiscal burden shift from employers’ SOC towards VAT will not have a significant 
effect on the country's trade balance. Actually it is indicated by modeling responses of trade 
balance to fiscal policy shocks with application of restrictions that were dictated by identified 
direction of causality.  
In their article, de Mooij and Keen (2012) argued that there is almost no empirical 
evidence bearing on the likely trade impact of a fiscal devaluation or on trade impacts of tax 
reforms more generally, but subsequently empirical research in this field has significantly 
increased. The results of this study somewhat contradict the rest of the empirical literature. 
Basically, the simulation results indicate the presence of a short-term positive effect on the 
economy as a whole, and on the trade balance in particular. Meanwhile very often researchers 
mention that price-taking on international markets can significantly reduce the positive effect 
of fiscal devaluation. Some authors recognize the endogeneity problem in models and try to 
mitigate it with different approaches – the use of instrumental variables or a priori restrictions. 
The current study tried to initially separate the variables on exogenous and endogenous and 
based on these results carry on the discussion about the fiscal devaluation appropriateness in 
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countries with small open economies. In empirical literature available to us the positive 
effects of fiscal devaluation were identified for the advanced economies which are members 
of OECD or eurozone. Fiscal devaluation had the greatest effect in eurozone countries (de 
Mooij and Keen 2012, Franco 2011). These results, in our opinion, are explained by the 
significant power of these countries on international markets.  
The policy implications for countries with small open economies are that the fiscal 
devaluation is unlikely to have any stimulating effect on domestic output or foreign trade. On 
the one hand it limits the instruments of fiscal policy; on the other hand, such countries 
usually have fewer liabilities relative to nominal exchange rate, so sound measures would be 
the adoption of a certain type of a floating exchange rate. However, as practice shows, the 
economic problems of small open economy countries, including many developing countries, 
often lie outside the influence of fiscal and monetary policy. Therefore, a critical point is also 
a significant reduction of corruption, improving of economic infrastructure, ensuring the 
transparency of the tax system, and reducing of administrative barriers to business. This 
policy increases the efficiency as monetary instruments, of well as those of fiscal instruments 
that do not apply to fiscal devaluation.  
A significant problem point of this research is that during the study period in Ukraine 
a structural shift in VAT taxation or SOC was not observed. The basic VAT rate was a 
constant 20%, and SOC rates varied insignificantly. This forced data manipulation, which are 
only an approximation of real fiscal devaluation. The presence in the study period of one or 
more significant tax burden shifts would increase the reliability of the findings and improve 
their economic interpretation. For further verification of the hypothesis put forward in this 
article additional information is needed, which can be extracted from the panel data. A 
promising avenue of research is to develop a statistical database for the small open 
economies, which with high probability are price-takers. The presence of structural changes in 
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the ratio of VAT and SOC is also desirable. Utilization of panel data will give more robust 
results regarding causality. This direction of research is promising, both in terms of general 
discussion on the possibilities of fiscal devaluation, and in terms of identifying new patterns 
of foreign trade development in developing countries.  
 
Notes 
1. Reduction of prices can’t be guaranteed, as exporters can simply increase profitability, including in 
the price expected return to the old system of taxation or realizing the impossibility of rapid 
expansion of their products consumption at reduced prices. 
2. Time series were tested in parallel with KPSS-test, the results of which practically coincide with 
the results of DF-GLS test. 
3. The order of lags was chosen using information criteria. For VAR-specification optimal number of 
lags equals 2 in accordance with AIC and HQC criteria, according to BIC-criterion – 1 lag. 
Cointegration tests indicate the presence of one stochastic trend for models with one and two lags. 
For further analysis we operate a model with one lag, as it has better statistical properties. 
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Table 1. Results of DF-GLS unit root test 
 
 
 
 
DF-GLS (H0: ρ=1, t-Stat.) 
Level 
First 
difference   
 
TB 
Included trend and intercept -2.41 
-7.14*** Included intercept -1.23 
 
FD 
Included trend and intercept -5.67*** 
 Included intercept -4.48*** 
 
tb 
Included trend and intercept -2.51* 
-5.81*** Included intercept -1.45 
 
fd 
Included trend and intercept -5.66*** 
 Included intercept -5.33*** 
 
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Table 2. Results of Granger causality tests 
 Null Hypothesis  
Lag d_tb does not Granger 
Cause fd 
fd does not Granger 
Cause d_tb 
d_TB does not 
Granger Cause 
TR_FD 
TR_FD does not 
Granger Cause d_TB 
1 0,0339 0,4826 0,000 0,7205 
2 0,03 0,625 0,000 0,709 
3 0,022 0,565 0,000 0,185 
4 0,032 0,334 0,000 0,261 
5 0,039 0,396 0,000 0,391 
6 0,072 0,564 0,000 0,281 
 
Table 3. Results of cointegration test between TB and FD (1 lag) 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test 
(Trace) 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test  
(Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistic Prob.** Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic Prob.** 
None *  0.439339  32.22161  0.0071  0.439339  27.77468  0.0024 
At most 1  0.088482  4.446922  0.6769  0.088482  4.446922  0.6769 
 
Notes: * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
  
30 
 
Table 4. VECM regression results with basic tests statistics 
 
Cointegrating Equation  
FD (-1)  1.000000 
TB (-1) 
-0.105084 
[-1.85185]* 
T 
-162.5582 
[-4.74650] 
C -1258.727 
Error Correction: D_FD D_TB 
Cointegrating Equation  -0.757537 [-5.45266] -0.016498 [-0.06365] 
D_FD (-1) -0.002647 [-0.02235]  0.165745 [ 0.75026] 
D_TB (-1)  0.153476 [ 2.38438]  0.140587 [ 1.17073] 
C  572.1699 [ 2.52134] -349.7251 [-0.82605] 
DUM_FD_0904  6649.217 [ 4.35655] -3515.856 [-1.23475] 
DUM_FD_1003  6194.185 [ 5.47936] -2592.173 [-1.22909] 
DUM_FD_1103  5645.135 [ 3.36056]  3034.345 [ 0.96823] 
DUM_TB_0502 -1533.544 [-1.00913] -7888.581 [-2.78244] 
DUM_TB_0901 -3588.241 [-2.22911]  7702.109 [ 2.56469] 
DUM_TB_1202  1041.606 [ 0.88370]  11827.32 [ 5.37854] 
 Adj. R-squared  0.763130 0.481784 
Residuals correlation 0.05 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
 
 
1.000000 
 0.348429 
 0.348429 
 0.212597 
Joint VEC Residual Normality Tests 
(Jarque-Bera)  
p = 0.56 
Joint VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Test 
(White Including Cross Terms) 
p = 0.99 
VEC Residual Portmanteau Tests for 
Autocorrelations 
 
Lag(1): Adj. Q-Stat = 2.247 (p=NA); Lag(2): Adj. Q-Stat = 
5.71 (0.22);   Lag(3): Adj. Q-Stat = 9.119 (0.33);   Lag(4): 
Adj. Q-Stat = 13.916 (0.30);   Lag(5): Adj. Q-Stat = 14.49 
(0.56);   Lag(6): Adj. Q-Stat = 15.29 (0.75)       
 
Note: * - t-statistics in [ ] 
 
Table 5. Results of Hsiao test with employing long-term equilibrium equation 
 
Lags 
(m,n) 
d_TB – controlled variable, 
TR_FD – manipulated variable 
TR_FD – controlled variable, 
d_TB – manipulated variable 
ܨܲܧ்஻(m) ܨܲܧ்஻ (m*,n) ܨܲܧி஽ (m) ܨܲܧி஽ (m*,n) 
1 7382246,377 7697222,222 2125686,436 1944765,575 
2 7882011,605 8201385,453 2236023,815 2023512,187 
3 8436853,002 8382820,785 2387356,573 2167556,246 
4 8861111,111 9008547,009 2553281,944 2253762,417 
5 9479665,072 9554668,305 2738172,967 2419828,734 
6 10109819,12 10301661,13   
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Figure1. Percentage of raw materials exports and imports of fuel and energy minerals for 
Ukraine 
 
Figure 2. Dynamics of trade balance and SOC-VAT variables in stationary form 
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Figure 3. Impulse response functions of trade balance and fiscal devaluation indicator 
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